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FLORIDA PREPAID v. COLLEGE SAVINGS:
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SUPPORTS
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER FEDERAL
PATENT LAW
Barry N. Youngt and Rachael A. Campbell"

I.

INTRODUCTION

In FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd v. College
Say. Bank, ("FloridaPrepaid'), the United States Supreme Court
dealt patentees a blow by denying their right to sue states in federal
court for patent infringement. FloridaPrepaidreversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which held that
Congress (by amending existing patent law 2) had validly abrogated
the states' sovereign immunity 3 from patent infringement suits
pursuant to the authority granted by section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 Although Congress had "clearly expressed its intent to
abrogate immunity" 5 and had ostensibly acted "pursuant to a valid
exercise of power," 6 the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act ("Patent Remedy Act" 7) could not be sustained as

t B.S., M.S. Louisiana State University; J.D. University of Maryland. Mr. Young is a partner at
Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich, LLP, Palo Alto.
"B.A, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate, (expected May, 2000) Santa Clara University
School of Law. Rachael can be reached at racampbelll @yahoo.com.
1. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1992); 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1992). Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act.
3. State sovereign immunity is granted by the U.S. Constitution. "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. Florida Prepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2202. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, "The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."
5. FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2204; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
6. FloridaPrepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1992); 35 U.S.C. §296(a) (1992).
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"appropriate '5 legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause9 because Congress had
exceeded its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II.BACKGROUND
College Savings Bank ("College Savings") marketed and sold
certificates of deposit, which were "essentially annuity contracts for
financing future college expenses,"' 0 and obtained a patent for this
financing method."
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, ("Florida Prepaid") an entity created by the state of
Florida, administered similar tuition prepayment contracts. 2 College
Savings brought an infringement action 3 against Florida Prepaid
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), claiming that Florida Prepaid had
4
directly, indirectly and willfully infringed College Savings' patent.'
A. Chew v. Californiaand The PatentRemedy Act
Before discussing FloridaPrepaid,an understanding of certain
prior events will be useful. The Patent Remedy Act was, in part a
direct response to the 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Chew v. California("Chew"). 15
In Chew, the patentee (an Ohio resident) brought suit against the
state of California alleging infringement of a patented method for
testing auto exhaust emissions.' 6 Chew alleged that Congress had
abrogated state sovereign immunity by use of the term "whoever" in
section 271 of the patent statute, 17 and by vesting exclusive

8. Florida Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2206; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507

(1997).
9. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2202. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides, "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2202.

11.

See id.

12. Seeid. at2203.
13. College Savings filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. See id.
at 2203.

14. See id.
15. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
16. Id. at 332.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides, in part: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent."
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jurisdiction in federal courts to decide patent infringement claims. 8
The Federal Circuit rejected both of these arguments, holding that
"Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself,' 9 and the
word "whoever" as used in the statute was too general to evidence
Congressional intent to abrogate. 20 The court noted that "the
exclusivity of a congressional power or the exclusiveness of the
federal court remedy had not been relied upon as grounds or support
for abrogation." 21 Due to California's immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, the court affirmed dismissal of Chew's suit for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 22 The United States
Supreme Court later noted the Paternt Remedy Act's objective was to
clarify that the term "whoever" as used in section 271 included any
State, instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a State in the definition of those subject to
suit in federal court for infringement of patents and plant variety
23
protections .
B. Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court decided Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida ("Seminole") 24. The impact of this case
was later felt severely by College Savings. In Seminole, the Court
was asked to decide whether the Eleventh Amendment prevented
Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States to
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause
(Article I).2 The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that
although Congress had evidenced a clear intent to abrogate, 26 Article I

18. See Chewv, 893 F.2d at 333.
19. Id. at 334 (emphasis added) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
243 (1985)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 335 (citing Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96,
100 (1989)).
22. See id. at 332.
23. See FloridaPrepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2203 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-560 preamble, 106
Stat. 4230).
24. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
25. See Id. at 53 (also discussing whether the doctrine of Ex Parte Young permitted suits
against a State's Governor to enforce a provision of the Act in question; an issue beyond the
scope of this case note).
26. See Id. at 47 (as required by Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240
(1985)). See also Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331,333 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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of the Constitution did not grant Congress authority to abrogate the
27
States' sovereign immunity.
The Court had previously found "authority to abrogate under
only two provisions of the Constitution." 28 These were section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment,2 9 and [in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.3 0 ("Union Gas")] the Interstate Commerce Clause, Article I,
section 8, clause 3.3 1 The Seminole Court overruled Union Gas
because it "ha[d] created confusion among the lower courts ... 2,32
Further, the Court explained, that "[n]ever before the decision in
Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be
expanded by Congress, operating pursuant to any constitutional
provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment." 33 The Court found
no principled distinction between the Indian Commerce Clause and
the Interstate Commerce Clause to support abrogation.3 4 Thus, after
Seminole, the sole authority under which Congress could abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity was section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. City of Boerne v. Flores
Although Seminole specifically preserved Congress' authority to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 3 the bounds of Congress' authority were still unclear.
In 1997, the Court addressed this issue in City of Boerne v. Flores
("City of Boerne")16 City of Boerne considered "whether the
[Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")] ... was a proper
exercise of Congress' § 5 power 'to enforce' by 'appropriate
legislation' the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any
person of 'life, liberty or property, without due process of law' ... ,37
The Court held the RFRA could not withstand constitutional

27.
28.
29.

See id. at 47.
Id. at 59.
See id.

30. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
31.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (citing Union Gas, 491

U.S. at 19-20.).
32.

Id. at 64.

33. Id. at 65.
34. See id. at 63.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 59.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 517.
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38

scrutiny.
Reiterating that the remedial nature of Congress' power under
section 5 extended "only to 'enforcing' the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment," 39 the Court acknowledged that distinctions
between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
those that make a substantive change in governing law must be
observed.40 The Court stated that appropriateness is determined by
"congruence and proportionality between the injury 4to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 41 It held that for
Congress to invoke section 5, it must identify conduct transgressing
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor
42
its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.
lm. DISCUSSION
A. ProceduralHistory
Thus, the stage was set for Florida Prepaid. When College
Savings filed suit in 1994, the Patent Remedy Act was in effect.43
After Seminole was decided in 1996, Florida Prepaid moved to
dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity, arguing that the "Patent
Remedy Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to use its
Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity."" College
Savings responded that "Congress had properly exercised its power
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
guarantees of the Due Process Clause in section 1 of the
Amendment." 45 The district court agreed with College Savings and
denied Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss; and the Federal Circuit
affirmed. 46 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the Patent Remedy Act validly abrogated the States'
sovereign immunity, and reversed. 47

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 536.
Id. at 519.
See id. at 519-20.
Id. at 520.
See City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2203.
Id. at 2204.
Id.
Id. Federal Circuit decision reported at 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2204.
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B. The Majority

The Court began its examination with the same two-part inquiry
utilized in Seminole.48 First, it considered whether Congress had
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states' immunity in
the Act.49 The Court agreed with the parties and the Federal Circuit
that, "in enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress made its intention
to abrogate the states' immunity 'unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute.' '5o Next the Court considered whether Congress had
acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power.5 1 Congress justified the
Patent Remedy Act on three sources of Constitutional authority: "the
Patent Clause, Art. I, § 8 el. 8; the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3; and'§ 5 'of the Fourteenth Amendment. '52 Since Seminole
held that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity under Article I powers, the Patent Remedy Act
could be sustained, if at all, only under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court noted that Seminole specifically reaffirmed
that "Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, '53 and proceeded
with its Due Process analysis.
The Court conceded that a patent is a form of property, and is
properly included in the protections of the Due Process Clause.5 4 The
Court also agreed with College Savings that, appropriate legislation
pursuant to the Enforcement Section (section 1) of the Fourteenth
Amendment could abrogate state sovereignty.5 5 However, the
legislation must be "appropriate" under section 5 as that term was
construed in City of Boerne.5 6 "Appropriateness" is determined by
first identifying conduct that transgresses the Fourteenth
48. See id. at 2205 (Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 2205 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
51. Seeid.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. In a related case decided the same day (College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999) the Court held the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act was not a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity; Florida had not
waived its immunity by its activities in interstate commerce; and, the "property rights" asserted
by College Savings (a right to be free of a business competitors false advertising and a more
generalized right to be secure in one's business interests) did not rise to the level of property
rights protected by the Due Process Clause.
55. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206.
56. See id.
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Amendment's substantive provisions, then tailoring legislation to
remedy or prevent such conduct.5 7 If the legislation is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot
be understood as responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitutional
behavior, it cannot stand."
The underlying conduct at issue in Florida Prepaid was state
infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny
patent owners compensation for infringement 9 The Court noted that
it was not the infringement itself by state action that was
unconstitutional, but the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property interest without due process of law.60 The Court found that
Congress had not identified a patten of patqnt infringement by the
states, "let alone a pattern of constitutional violations,"'61 and noted
this "lack of evidence" compared to the undisputed record of racial
discrimination in voting rights cases. 62 The Court conceded that state
infringement of a patent rises to the level of a constitutionally
protected interest, but held there is no constitutional violation unless
the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies. 6 Despite
evidence in the record that Congress had considered the uncertain
availability of state law remedies, the Court noted that "the primary
point.., was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate,
but rather that they were less convenient than federal remedies and
might undermine the uniformity of patent law."64 The Court also
dismissed a concern that a patchwork of state laws would undermine
the goal of national uniformity. It stated that "the need for uniformity
in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important,but that is
a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus ."..,65
However, after Seminole, Article I did not grant Congress the power
66
to enact such legislation.
The Court next quoted precedent to support its view that a state
actor's negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person's

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 2207.
See id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
See id.
See id. at 2208.
FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2207.
See id.
See id. at 2208.
Id. at 2209 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Seeid. at2211.
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property does not deprive that person of property within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause.6 7 Although the Court appeared to
acknowledge the strict liability nature of patent infringement,68 it
found scant support in the record for Congress' conclusion that states
were depriving patent owners of due process of law by pleading
sovereign immunity in federal court patent actions.6 9 The Court
noted, "[t]he legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy
Act does not respond to a history of 'widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress has faced in
enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation." 70 Rather, the Court
found that Congress had enacted ,the Patent Remedy Act in response
to "a handful of instances, of state patent infringement that do not
necessarily violate the Constitution." 7'
The Court observed that Congress did nothing to limit the
coverage of the Act to cases involving arguably constitutional
violations, such as where a state refuses to offer any state-court
remedy, or limit the remedy to nonnegligent infringement, to
infringement pursuant to state policy, or against states with
questionable remedies. 72 Therefore, the Court held Congress could
not validly rely on the Fourteenth Amendment's authorization of
"appropriate legislation" to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 73
Essentially, the Court felt that Congress overreached its authority by
not limiting the Patent Remedy Act to situations involving clear
failure by the states to provide remedies for patent infringement.
C. The Dissent
The dissent74 viewed the Patent Remedy Act as an appropriate
exercise of Congress' power under section 575 for three principle
reasons. First, there was adequate evidence of due process violations
based upon the absence of effective state remedies for patent
67. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2209.
68. See id. (citing 5 DONALD S. CIUSUM, CISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02, at 16-31 (rev. ed.
1998)).
69. The Federal Circuit opinion had identified only eight patent infringement suits against
states in the 110 years between 1880 and 1990. See id. at 2207.
70. Id. at 2210 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 2210.
73. FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2210-11.
74. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer filed the dissenting
opinion. See id. at 2211.
75. See id.
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infringement by states 76 Second, Congress had sufficient evidence of
heavy state involvement in the patent system, 77 and the Patent
Remedy Act merely put the states in the same position as private
users of the patent system, as well as in substantially the same
position as the United States itself.78 Finally, the dissent emphasized
the need for national uniformity in the patent system, 79 and the longtime statutory pre-emption of state jurisdiction over patent
infringement cases. 0
The dissent criticized the majority for failing to answer the real
question, i.e., whether the Patent Remedy Act may be applied to
willful infringement,8 1 arguing the majority had ignored the facts of
the case.82 Looking to the najority's reasoning based on perceived
deficiencies in the evidence reviewed by Congress before enacting the
Patent Remedy Act,83 the dissent stated: "[1]it is quite unfair for the
Court to strike down Congress' Act based on an absence of findings
supporting a requirement this Court had not yet articulated.8 The
legislative history... makes it abundantly clear that Congress was
attempting to hurdle the then-most-recent barrier this Court had
erected...,"85 The dissent was referring to the "clear statement" rule
of Atascadero and Chew, decisions to which the Patent Remedy Act
responded. Congress had heard testimony about inadequate state
remedies 6 (as required by City of Boerne), and found that states and
their instrumentalities were heavily involved in the patent system, and
that "state infringement of patents was likely to increase." 87 The
dissent found it particularly ironic that the majority relied on lack of
evidence of state remedies given the fact that Congress had long ago
pre-empted state jurisdiction over patent infringement cases.88
Furthermore, even if "such remedies might be available in theory, it
76. See id. at 2217.
.
77. See id. at 2215 n.8..
78. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2218.
79. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2211-13.
80. See id. at 2216.
81. Seeid. at2213.
82. See id. at 2214.
83. See id. at2214.
84. See The Patent Remedy Act was enacted in 1992, but City of Boerne was not decided
until 1997.
85. FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at2214.
86. See id.
87. Id. at2215.
88. Id. at2216.
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would have been 'appropriate' for Congress to conclude that they
would not guarantee due process in infringement actions against state
defendants."89 The dissent argued that state judges have never had
exposure to patent litigation and, unlike infringement actions brought
in federal district court, their decisions would not be reviewable by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.y0 The dissent concluded
City of Boerne amply supported congressional authority to enact the
Patent Remedy Act, whether one assumed state infringement to be
scarce or widespread. 9'
Furthermore, the dissent argued persuasively that Congress had
sufficient evidence of due process violations before it to meet the
standard expressed in City of Boerne.92 The RFRA had sought to
change the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, not to remedy or
prevent violations of the Clause as the Court had interpreted it.93 The
Patent Remedy Act, "was Congress' attempt to prevent violation of
due process based upon a substantiated fear that states would be
unable or unwilling to provide adequate remedies for their own
violation of patent-holders rights.' 94 In City of Boerne, there was no
congruence between the means used and ends achieved because of the
sweeping nature of the statute. However, the sole purpose of the
Patent Remedy Act was to abrogate state sovereign immunity as a
defense to a charge of patent infringement. 95 It had no impact
whatsoever on any substantive rule of state law, but merely
effectuated federal policy to confine patent litigation to federal
judges. 96 As a result, the dissent found that sufficient congruence
existed between the means used and the end achieved to justify
Congress' action as an appropriate exercise of power under section 5
97
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, the dissent emphasized the importance of national
uniformity in patent law as a long-standing proposition. Justice Story
said of the Patent and Copyright Clauses to the Federal Constitution,
"[i]t is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
See id.at2216.
See FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2216.
See id. at2217.
See id.
Id.
See id. at2218.
Seeid. at2218.
See FloridaPrepaid,119 S.Ct. at 2218.
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possess this power; ... [because authors and inventors would
otherwise] be subjected to the varying laws and systems of the
different states ... which would impair, and might even destroy the
value of their rights .... .98
The dissent argued, "sound reasons
support both Congress' authority over patents and its decision in 1800
to vest exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement litigation in the
federal courts."9 9 For example, the substantive law applied in patent
infringement cases is entirely federal; there is a strong federal interest
in a uniform interpretation of patent statutes; and patent infringement
litigation is often technical, raising issues unfamiliar to the average
trial judge.' °° In fact, that consideration as well as divergence among
the federal circuits in their interpretation of patent issues gave rise to
the congressional decision to consolidate appellate jurisdiction in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.101 The dissent also criticized
the majority's comment that the need for uniformity is a factor which
belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus; asserting that Article I
is directly relevant because it establishes the constitutionality of the
basic congressional decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction over patent
infringement cases in the federal courts.102 According to the dissent,
this basic decision was "unquestionably appropriate," therefore, "it
was equally appropriate for Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity in patent infringement cases."'0 3
IV. CONCLUSION

FloridaPrepaidwill undoubtedly have far-reaching impact for
patentees. Patentees now occupy a very precarious position relative
to the states, and are left with the prospects of no uniform, viable
forum for addressing state violation of their property rights. This is
particularly true after the Court's decision in Alden v. Maine. °4 At
least one district court has attempted to circumvent FloridaPrepaid;
in New Star Lasers v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. ("New Star")'0 5 the
court held that a state university's Eleventh Amendment immunity
98. Id.
at 2211-12.
99. Id. at 2212.
100. See id.
101. See id..
102. See id. at 2213.
103. Id.
104. 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999) (Congress may not subject a state to suit in state court, without
its consent).
105. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D Cal. 1999).
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was waived by its acquisition of a patent. New Star referred to the
companion case to FloridaPrepaid,0 6 which held that the doctrine of
constructive waiver as set out in Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala.
Docks Dep't,07 was overruled, but confirmed the proposition that,
"Congress can compel a waiver where the State seeks not merely to
engage in 'otherwise lawful activity' but rather receives a 'gift or
gratuity' or 'federal beneficence' that Congress may rightfully
withhold."'' 0 The New Star court held that since a patent is a unique
form of nationally recognized intellectual property created by
Congress pursuant to its authority under the Patent Clause, it
constituted a "gift or gratuity" bestowed by the federal government. 0 9
Therefore, if Congress conditions the receipt of such a gift on a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, then Congress has acted
permissibly." 0 To date, New Star stands but has been criticized,
"Justice Shubb appears to be climbing out on a limb in reading the
Patent Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 as a forced waiver statute
rather than an abrogation statute.""' Ultimately, it is doubtful that the
reasoning of New Star will stand.
Until Congress reacts to FloridaPrepaid with another attempt
to meet the criteria articulated by the Court for abrogation of state
sovereign immunity, patentees are left with the option of convincing a
state to waive its immunity to suit in federal court or articulating a
viable state law theory to assert in state court. Neither advances the
public policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts
in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

106. College Say. v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219
(1999) (holding that the Lanham Act did not apply to state trademark infringement).
107. 377 U.S. 184(1964).
108. New Star, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
109. See id. at 1244.
110. Seeid.
111. State University Waived Immunity From Suit to Declare Patent Invalid, 58 Pat.,
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1442, at 595 (Sept. 23, 1999).

